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Professors Amman and Baer analyze the Labor experiment in Brazil 2003-2005, led by the 
Administration of President Lula da Silva and his Workers' Party (PT – Partido dos 
Trabalhadores). In the first part, the authors describe the PT's program prior to the 
presidential election of 2002 and they point out its emphasis on social goals, particularly 
concerning equity and redistribution. Secondly, they give an account of the macro-economic 
developments since the beginning of 2003 till the first half of 2005, showing the effects of 
economic policies actually followed by the new government. Under this framework, they 
highlight the contradiction between the previous program of social policies and the practice 
when Lula da Silva and the PT became responsible for the Brazil's government. In the final 
part of the paper, the authors adduce their arguments about the process and the strategic 
choices in the field of economic policy, made by the Lula's government. In particular, they 
doubt on the compatibility between orthodox measures and the implementation of social 
policies, and think that the chosen sequence was not a good one. Basically, this would lead, 
first, to macroeconomic control through orthodox policies, - like high interest rates, primary 
fight against inflation, budgetary balance or even surplus, and to let the exchange rate 
fluctuate even when it goes upwards - and only, in a later step, trying to achieve significant 
social improvements like large redistribution measures in favor of the poor, excluded people 
and underpaid workers. 
 
The paper is well documented and has quite relevant and updated information on key social 
and economic indicators over the period under analysis. Moreover, it openly brings up the 
major economic dilemmas of similar labor political experiences (like that “opposing” growth 
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and redistribution), and to some extent, also of many developing countries that have tried to 
upgrade their economic and social status, as shown in the literature references. Based on their 
deep knowledge of the Brazilian economy, particularly at its present stage, the authors 
provide a subtle analysis of this issue and related topics. 
 
Although I agree with many points raised in the paper, I would not be so critic of the strategy 
adopted by Lula’s government so far. It is true that from the growth rate point of view, even if 
we consider the slight recession of the initial year as caused by factors that the new 
government couldn’t control - financial turbulence and exchange overshooting of 2002 and 
their consequences on the real economy -, the Brazilian performance has been modest 
(annual growth rate of 4.9% in 2004, and estimated around 3% in 2005 up to October; source 
IBGE/IPEA) and lags far behind the Asian giants like China or India. But the present 
Brazilian case has a lot of peculiarities, and needs to be put in a historical context, bearing in 
mind not only the evolution of Latin America during the last decades, but also other previous 
Labor Government experiences in different parts of the world. Moreover, Brazil under Lula’s 
government gains a new light if it is analyzed focusing on long term considerations rather 
than short term ones. Afterwards, in relation to the paper of Professors Amman and Baer, I 
draw attention to the main aspects that, in my view, must be considered for a complete and 
more balanced appraisal of this experience. 
 
1. After a virtual eclipse in the 1990s, the decade of 2000 is clearly witnessing a return in 
Latin America of governments' activist programs regarding social policies and reforms. These 
new experiments, however, gain if they take into consideration the outcomes of similar 
historical attempts in Latin America and elsewhere, like those of Allende's Chile 1970-73, 
Argentina 1973-1976, Portugal 1974-75. Of course, we live in different times, but their main 
lessons should not be underestimated, particularly with regard to their economic rationale. In 
all of them, the immediate and large "social conquests" were quickly eroded within a few 
years if not in a shorter time, through rising inflation and in the middle of huge 
macroeconomic imbalances (in external and public accounts). Sometimes, in the very 
beginning, a surge in growth led by booming popular consumption, proved to be ephemeral, 
and effectively triggered the disequilibrium process. 
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In historical retrospect, among others, I could remember the case of France's socialist 
government of 1981 that, despite not so dramatic outcomes as in the three previous examples, 
had to change its planned policies within approximately two years. I should also recall that 
even in Brazil, the first government of Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945) with its relatively 
generous social policies for wage earners has proved to be the start of a long period of 
uncontrolled inflation and hyperinflation that plagued the country during several decades. 
 
Therefore, even if redistribution is all the more desirable for Brazil, we cannot fall into the 
illusion of a rapid egalitarian change in income distribution, particularly under a democratic 
regime, and in a market environment. In spite of some temporary satisfaction, more or less 
generalized, at the initial stage, later on, tensions would rise at several levels eventually 
leading to a collapse of the process. Good intentions are not a good adviser for Labor 
governments engaged in deep social policies. Thus, refuting to embark in such a path, Lula's 
government made a wise decision and a step forward and probably, in the long run, conveyed 
a way for a consistent social improvement in the situation of the large Brazilian masses. 
 
Concluding this point, it should be stressed that the government of Lula da Silva has 
demonstrated a sense of realism in a central issue of its program, accepting that social 
reforms need a sound macroeconomic foundation. Moreover, so far, it has conducted this 
policy in a credible way, and within a coherent model. 
 
2. One of the main questions in this context is redistribution itself, particularly through 
legislation. Let's look first at the case of a minimum wage increase. In a situation of high 
unemployment (open plus hidden; see table 4, c) and d)), as is currently the case of Brazil, a 
substantial rise in the minimum wage will very likely boost unemployment even more (as 
happened in Portugal in the 1970s). Moreover, the introduction of rigidity in the labor market 
in response to rising unemployment - for example, limiting lay-offs - is not a satisfactory 
solution. Thus, a cautious policy in this domain seems much more desirable. 
 
As far as concerns a real wages' increase it has essentially to be supported by improvements 
in productivity, since otherwise they will fall again. A strategy of higher wages and salaries 
not proportional to productivity is perhaps tenable for a while in a background of extensive 
and articulated structural reforms (higher wages will pick up productivity), but this seems not 
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yet to be the case of Brazil. Hence, a long-term policy stimulating the factors leading to 
greater productivity would be a much clever step in order to reach a sustained increase in real 
wages. 
 
In these circumstances, instead of rapid higher wages the preference for the reduction of 
unemployment seems quite appropriate, and the Lula’s government can be credited of some 
success in this field (for example, the rate of total unemployment in São Paulo decreased 
from 20.6% in March 2004 to 16.9% in October 2005; source DIEESE). 
 
Regarding the case of social expenses, Fome Zero and similar measures, Professors Amman 
and Baer themselves recognize that there is bad administration and insufficient knowledge of 
the field. Under these circumstances, a substantial increase in this kind of public spending 
risked to be a waste in a country that has not so many resources, and very likely would not 
help the people who need more (as the case of social security before the reform of 2003 
proves well). All in all, it seems not to be a mistake to rethink these programs in order to 
target better the social objectives. 
 
3. Lula's government is not clearly a free market advocate one. It maintains a high level of 
State intervention (much higher than Mexico, Argentina or Chile), raised taxes, and stopped 
the privatization process launched in the 1990s. In addition, official regulatory agencies 
imposed social obligations in some sectors, especially to firms of public utilities. It may be 
observed how these situations tend to last for a long time, and are often used to increase 
quantitatively the level of State intervention. 
 
Professors Amman and Baer argue that orthodox measures will increase the weight of non-
discretionary expenses (payments of the debt service, federal transfers to the States), and, as 
discretionary expenses are well defined by the Constitution, there will not be enough room to 
find public financial resources for investments in social programs, education and 
infrastructures. For tackling this issue one should take into account that the Brazilian 
economy underwent a major change in the last years, and in 2004 for the first time, since long 
ago, it grew with low inflation in so far its annual rate has gradually declined from 12.5% in 
2002 to 5.9% in 2005 up to October (source FGV/Banco Central), and without a significant 
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increase in public spending. In addition, contrary to the 1990s after the Plano Real, external 
and public accounts are balanced and stabilized. 
 
However, acknowledging these facts, the authors seem pessimists about the growth prospects 
of Brazil on this basis. So, they suggest a temporary softening of the orthodox policies, 
particularly of the monetary policy, in order to promote growth (and consequently, to attain 
some social objectives). This way would probably lead to the emergence of a new vicious 
circle: more inflation – low rising prices is a relatively recent phenomenon in Brazil -, and, 
later, tough measures to combat it again and a general return to economic and financial 
instability, including slow growth or even worse, and unemployment. On the contrary, with 
less inflation and the appreciation of the real as it happened throughout most of 2005, there 
will be more room for cutting interest rates and to implement other measures that stimulate 
growth. 
 
With respect to public expenses, a priori, it will be better to rationalize rather than to increase 
them (such an increase without cover would lead to more public debt, and consequently, to 
more non-discretionary expenses, etc.). 
 
In my view, in the long run, it is preferable to have a coherent model that creates conditions 
for sound and sustained growth than to play a game of "stop and go", with the policymakers 
basically concentrated in short-term macroeconomic objectives. The latter situation would 
mean, in fact, stagnation. 
 
4. In the 2000s, the respect of fiscal and monetary orthodoxy, as it is, at another level, the 
voicing of freer trade by Brazil and other countries of the region (at least, in comparison with 
the USA and EU) are a positive turn in the mentality of Latin American policymakers, no 
matter their political origin. Nevertheless, it is worth noting, that even some of these 
policymakers got influence, as it happens in the Brazilian case, their position is weak because 
these policies are perceived as unpopular and there is a strong preference, for example in the 
media, for visible short-term effects. Also, the support of the Brazilian business community 
must not be exaggerated; illustrative of this is the fact that Vice-president José Alencar, a 
businessman by profession, has frequently and strongly voiced against “high interest rates” 
and other policies of the government. On the other hand, many employers are State dependent 
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through public orders and there is, in the existing context, important restraints at this level. 
Multilateral institutions may approve, but, as remarked below, they are not in deep touch with 
the local situation. Last but not least, there is even considerable division among economists 
about this issue. 
 
After the expected failure in the 1990s of the models inspired by the so-called "Washington 
Consensus", a possible development for Latin America is the emergence of a peculiar 
equilibrium. Fortunately, authoritarian regimes no longer rule Latin America, democracy, 
perhaps imperfect in some cases, guides the majority of the countries and the people may 
choose their governments. In the absence of clear results of many elected governments of the 
1990s, sometimes influenced by moral hazard considerations, the voters opted for parties and 
personalities with language close to them. This may represent some risks, but the existence of 
some local policymakers that respect economic fundamentals and have credentials in this 
sense, is a good anchor to avoid an evolution to the worst and a step backward in the 
liberalization process. 
 
Political considerations also matter, and, likely, Labor governments may be quite appropriate 
to manage reforms with social costs (for example, taking into account their close ties with the 
trade unions). In the achievement of social measures, more than blatant ideology, structural 
reforms actually needed by the Brazilian economy, as was the case of social security reform 
described in the paper, are a much wiser step in a long run perspective, regardless of a 
momentary bitterness of radical supporters. This means that a wider scope, including not only 
economic but also political considerations, helps us to understand all that is at stake in these 
experiences. 
 
Summing up, the Latin American governments that opt for orthodox policies aiming at a later 
achievement of broad social objectives, must keep them (as is the case for free trade and 
integration in the world economy), even if they are advised otherwise. Taking China and 
India as examples, they are rapidly growing and opening up to the world economy but, at the 
same time, they essentially respect macroeconomic fundamentals (i.e., consumer prices in 
2005 up to October, percentage change on year ago, grew, respectively, 1.2% and 4.2; The 
Economist). The former group of countries, however, must creatively use the policies they 
adopt. In the circumstances of the Brazilian case just analyzed, this means that at a later 
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stage, when credibility is consolidated, the government may be more flexible in its monetary 
and budgetary measures. More generally, for countries aiming at more income equity in the 
course of their development, such a sequence may provide, in the long run, the way for a 
sustained growth that benefits all its population (in Latin America and elsewhere). 
 
5. In any case, I do not say that the Lula's experiment will succeed, even if there is a 
continuation of its specific solution - the electoral calendar of 2006 may eventually imply 
changes - for the trade-off between orthodox measures and the implementation of social 
reforms in the chosen sequence. There is always a problem of good management and 
supervision of all the process. If other dimensions, particularly at the political level (e.g., the 
problem of “mensalão” and its shock waves), gain ground over the rest, we should be able to 
make a distinction between the economic and the political administration of this Labor 
government, where the former represented a different and promising path about how to tackle 
the dilemma between orthodox policies and the implementation of social reforms. 
 
 
Lisbon, December 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
